




















A GREEN REVOLUTION FOR AFRICA – DOES IT NEED TO BE SO CONTROVERSIAL? 
 
 




















Due to sub-Saharan Africa’s recurrent food-crises and enhanced difficulties to feed its 
growing population, calls for a Green Revolution – a substantially raised agricultural 
productivity by means of scientific modernization and supportive institutional reforms – 
are often aired. However, in other camps the Green Revolution is seen as undesireable 
generally and as particularly unsuitable for Africa. 
  This paper takes a closer look at this debate, analyses the arguments forwarded 
and discusses the pros and cons of a Green Revolution in Africa. It is emphasized that 
the Green Revolution – contrary to what many seem to believe – is not a static ’thing’ to 
be imported whole-sale. On the contrary, it is highly dynamic and, due to recent 
scientific break-throughs, it may now – perhaps for the first time – be adapted to 
Africa’s physical, ecological and socio-economic preconditions. The paper ends with 
some suggestions about what a Green Revolution ’African style’ might look like. 
 
                                                 
1 This paper is written within the framework of the Afrint research project, headed by professor Göran 
Djurfeldt, Dept. of Sociology, University of Lund, Sweden. Afrint stands for: ‘African Food Crisis — the 
Relevance of Asian Models’ and concerns itself with (possibilities for) intensification of food production 
in sub-Saharan Africa. The project is financed jointly by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation 
and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), which is hereby gratefully 
acknowledged. I would also like to express my gratitude to Astrig Tasgian, Suri Ratnapala and Magnus 
Jirström for valuable comments on an earlier draft and to Mikael Hammarskjöld for tirelessly looking up 




As we have just entered a new millennium, we are reminded of Africa’s recurrent 
problems to feed itself.
2 The present food-crises in southern Africa and the Horn of 
Africa, involving at least seven countries and threatening millions of people with 
starvation, indicates that something needs to be done in order to dramatically and 
sustainably increase food security on the continent. With, in large parts of Africa, few 
natural resources such as oil or gas to exploit, industry only rudimentary devel-oped and 
scarce financial resources to pay for food imports, enhanced productivity in indigenous 
food production appears to be the only option available. Hence, calls for a Green 
Revolution are frequently heard – but are also criticised for being the wrong medicine. 
Why does this suggestion arouse so much controversy? There are probably several 
reasons for this and my intention is not to engage with them all. However, while 
sceptics sometimes do present good arguments, many critics appear to have an 
unwarranted static and simplistic view of the Green Revolution. Many also confuse 
technological issues with those of politics and ownership. Critics, therefore, often tend 
to overlook essential aspects of the problematic and risk throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater. This paper sets out to discuss some of the issues raised in this debate and, 
thereafter, to suggest what a new Green Revolution – African style – might look like.  
 
 
The African Conundrum 
In less than fifty years’ time, the world population is expected to reach ten billion 
(UNFPA 1993). Africa has the highest population growth rate of all the world’s major 
regions and Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is expected to almost double from 750 
million in 1998 to 1,3 billion people in 2025 (UN, 1999). According to the FAO, most 
African countries have experienced a slowdown in agricultural food production since 
the 1960s and per capita output of cereals decreased by 13% between 1961 and 2001 
(FAO, 2002). This simple exercise has given cause for Malthusian concerns over 
Africa’s future. However, it needs to be emphasized that there is more to it than just 
numbers. At present, bad policies in Zimbabwe and malpractices at high political-
administrative levels in Malawi have at least contributed to the contemporary hardships. 
Also, a more equal distribution of food entitlement would, most likely, have reduced the 
severity of the present situation. Poverty or, to use an euphemism from economics, ‘lack 
                                                 
2 For reasons of simplicity, I will use the term ‘Africa’ although most of the discussion concerns sub-
Saharan Africa.  
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of effective demand’ often causes more suffering from famine than do food shortages as 
such (Sen 1982). But this does not imply that the need to improve productivity in food 
production should be overlooked. On the contrary, it seems imperative not only to 
spread food-entitlement in a fairer way, but also to enhance food availability. As noted 
by Griffin (1993:189), “[r]edistribution alone can go part way towards eliminating the 
worst forms of poverty, but it cannot go all the way. Sustained growth of per capita 
income is essential”. In predominantly agrarian societies, such as those in Africa, this 
growth must come from an increase in agricultural productivity. However, when it 
comes to the means to increase food production, suggested remedies seem incompatible. 
This is most visible when it comes to a: interpretations of the Green Revolution, and b: 
statements about whether it is (or can be made) a suitable solution for Africa. 
 
 
A Static View of the Green Revolution 
By the term ‘Green Revolution’ in agriculture is commonly understood the 
incorporation of scientific advances in plant breeding coupled to the introduction or 
expansion of some supporting technologies giving rise to substantial increases in area-
productivity of major food crops. Quite often, the Green Revolution is interpreted as a 
rather simple package of modern technology (seed, fertilizer, irrigation), introduced in – 
or imposed upon – more or less traditional agricultural systems, the productivity levels 
of which it seeks to improve. It had its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s when, in Latin 
America and Asia, substantial yield increases were attained due to the adoption of high-
yielding varieties of rice, wheat and maize. Irrigation was often a prerequisite for these 
‘miracle crops’ and they further needed the application of chemical fertilizer and 
pesticides to reach optimal productivity. Hence, it has been claimed that the Green 
Revolution is essentially a chemical revolution or basically a matter of irrigation 
(Madeley 2002). As such, it is often believed, it is not suitable for Africa. 
 
This is too simplistic a description, however, and although technology does constitute 
the central part of the Green Revolution, the ‘package’ also contained “a range of 
policies that support the modern over the traditional” (Friis-Hansen 2000:6). Djurfeldt 
and Jirström (2002:17), highlighting these extra-technological aspects of the Asian 
Green Revolutions, write that they typically involved “a considerable degree of direct 
and indirect state intervention” in areas deemed crucial for agricul-tural development,  
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notably investments in research, roads and irrigation infrastructure, extension, credit and 
price controls. A broader conception than those commonly offered therefore seems war-
ranted. 
 
There is no doubt that implementing a Green Revolution strategy “places heavy 
demands upon the State” (Griffin 1993:238). And it remains to be seen whether – after 
Structural Adjustments – governments in Africa have the strength and the resources to 
carry it out. While highlighting this problematic, a short paper like this must limit its 
scope.
3 Hence, the following discussion will confine itself primarily to issues of 
technology. After penetrating this topic, a few words will be said about what a Green 
Revolution ‘African style’ might look like. 
 
Size 
First, the spread of the Green Revolution – both in terms of content and spatial coverage 
– appears to be much broader than what is generally claimed. For example, Africa is 
often said to have been ‘by-passed’ by the Green Revolution (e.g. ICRISAT 2001) but, 
as will be shown below, that is hardly a correct statement.
4 Moreover, it is sometimes 
stated that, in Africa – if and where it happened – the Green Revolution technology has 
primarily been directed towards cash crops for export such as cotton, cacao, coffee and 
groundnuts and, therefore, it has not improved food availability in the region (SANE 
2001) and, implicitly, there is not much hope that it would. Even though this is a 
widespread belief, there is today substantial evidence that food crops – notably maize
5 – 
have for long been prominent objects of Green Revolution research and implementation 
in Africa south of the Sahara (see e.g. Beyerlee & Eicher 1997). It has thus been 
reported that the foundation of Zimbabwe’s maize-based Green Revolution was laid 
                                                 
3 This is one of the questions that the Afrint research-project aims to answer — in due time. Apart from 
raising the question, it would be premature to try and answer it at this stage (but see Larsson et al (2002) 
for discussions of this and related issues). 
4 It is true, however, that the Green Revolution has not been of the same magnitude in Africa as in Asia, 
but that does not imply that it ‘never happened’ in Africa. 
5 Rice has been another Green Revolution crop arousing much hope — and research investments — in 
Africa, and particularly in West Africa which is generally considered to have a sufficient irrigation 
potential. Rice research has been going on ever since the first attempts to transfer high-yielding Asian 
varieties were made in the 1960s. For various reasons, success did not occur until at the turn of the 
millennium when a break-through in high-yielding hybrid rice was reported from the West African Rice 
Development Association (WARDA) in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast. This superior NERICA-rice is an early 
maturing, drought and disease tolerant cross-breeding of Asian and African varieties, report-edly capable 
of increasing yields between 50 and 200 percent over traditional varieties (The Financial Gazette 2001, 
The Lancet 2002). The circumstance that this break-through did not occur until recently, is not an 
indication that food-crops such as rice have been neglected in Africa but rather an illustration of the long 
time commonly needed before this kind of crop research results in marketable products.  
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early in the century by commercial white farmers who initiated research on hybrid 
maize in 1932. In 1949 the first high-yielding variety was released, followed by 
improved varieties in the 1960s and 1970s (Eicher & Kupfuma 1997). Likewise, in 
Kenya, white commercial farmers initiated hybridisation programmes in the 1930s, 
allowing them to release the first synthetic in 1961 and the first hybrids in 1964 
(Harrison 1970; see also Hassan & Karanja 1997). Also in Nigeria, a maize-based 
Green Revolution had an early start and maize became an important crop following the 
introduction of an improved open-pollinated variety in the mid-1970s (Goldman & 
Smith (1995); see also Lawrence (1988), Turner et al (1993), Smith et al (1997)). These 
findings suggest that the Green Revolution was indeed present also in Africa. Moreover, 
even if the African Green Revolution did not have the same impact as in Asia, it was 
not confined to cash-crops for export and it was initiated at about the same time as its 
more well-known counterparts in other parts of the world. 
 
Scope 
The Green Revolution is often defined as if it were confined to the three major cereals 
(rice, wheat and maize) (e.g. FAO 1996) and, therefore, it should not be suitable for 
Africa where, except for maize, other food crops (e.g. millet, sorghum, roots and tubers) 
are more important (see e.g. Asiema 2002). Also this is a too narrow and static 
definition of the Green Revolution. Actually, there were good reasons to start doing 
research on how to improve the yields of rice and wheat when such research started in 
the 1930s. After all, these are the most crucial sources of food for the large majority of 
the world’s population and there was, at the time, a great “backlog of scientific and 
technical knowledge to draw on” which was missing for other crops (Hayami & Ruttan 
1985:270). Focussing initially on these crops (but, as we have seen, maize was not 
neglected at the time) was not only ‘natural’ – considering the time and costs involved 
in this kind of research, it would have been difficult to justify an initial concentration of 
effort to issues of more limited foreseeable impact – but Green Revolution research did 
not stop there. It has since come to include a much broader range of crops, some of 
which are highly relevant in an African context. Among these one can mention 
improved varieties such as hybrid sorghum, high-yielding cowpeas, sweet-potatoes and 
bananas, as well as pest-resistant cassava and rice varieties adapted to African 
preconditions (Larsson et al 2002). Moreover, “the largest share of [the CGIAR’s] 
research funding – around 38 per cent of an annual average of $280 mn over the past  
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five years – is for crops in sub-Saharan Africa” (Harsch 2001:1).
6 Over time, emphasis 
has also shifted from a common earlier focus on yields towards a current focus on early 
maturation, pest resistance and drought tolerance (ibid.).
7 This not only makes the 
Green Revolution broader than what is often believed, it also makes it more ‘Africa-
friendly’ than it previously was. Hence, it would be a pity to dismiss the Green 
Revolution now on the ground that its scope is “too narrow”. 
 
Not Suitable for Africa? 
There may be other grounds, however. One could be the technology’s dependence on 
irrigation. In Africa, more than 90 percent of the farm area is rain-fed and irrigation, 
except for a few large projects such as the Gezira scheme in Sudan, is not widespread. 
This has made many believe that only few farmers in small areas would benefit from a 
Green Revolution in Africa. It has been claimed that, in Asia, where irrigation is much 
more extensive, high-yielding varieties of rice “have only benefited farmers with 
irrigation. About 40 per cent of the area under rice in Asia is not irriga-ted and farmers 
have seen no benefit” (Madeley 2002:22). This argument is a bit disingenuous. What 
the above sentence does say, is that more than half of the Asian rice acreage – and, 
hence, the peasants working that land – has benefited from the Green Revolution. This, 
actually, is not so bad. Moreover, in which other circumstances do we demand a close 
to one hundred per cent success in order to be satisfied? The claim that ‘farmers have 
seen no benefit’ is also too general and does not follow from the information provided 
(it is also contradicted by a substantial number of research reports).  
 
It is, of course, a correct observation that improved varieties of the major cereals were 
primarily adopted in the “agricultural heartlands in well-endowed [i.e. irrigated] areas of 
Asia and Latin America” (Asiema 2001:1), and that Africa, with much less irrigation 
and a smaller irrigation potential, was to some extent “bypassed by the Green 
Revolution of the 1960s/70s” (ICRISAT, 2001; emphasis added). As mentioned above, 
Africa is not being bypassed – it would probably be more accurate to say that Africa’s 
Green Revolution has largely been delayed – and, moreover, this need no longer be the 
                                                 
6 CGIAR = the Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research, comprising of 16 collaborating 
regional and international agricultural research centers (of which five are located in Africa), each 
specializing in different research fields and with world-wide responsibility for different crops. 
7 This, however, is not to say that these objectives were neglected in earlier research. In e.g. Kenya, 
attention was directed to breeding for drought and pest resistance as well as early maturation already in 
the 1950s (Harrison 1970).  
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case. With the stronger emphasis today on drought tolerance and early maturation in 
agricultural research, the time might have come for Africa to share the benefits of the 
Green Revolution. Moreover, although the potential for expanding irrigated area is 
limited in Africa, the circumstance that “unpredictable droughts put (…) no less than 
80% of the farmland under climatic risk” (SANE, 2001:1) actually points to a greater 
need for irrigation-based tech-nologies where such can be introduced. In the African 
case, irrigation (or, rather, water-control) may also have a greater potential in stabilising 
harvests than in boosting them (Holmén 2002a). 
 
Exaggerations About Social Non-desirability 
The social effects of the Green Revolution have also been seen as a reason to reject the 
‘package’. Not only are peasants, in some unspecified way, said ‘not to have benefited’ 
(see Madeley above), but also much critique claims that the Green Revolution has been 
skewed against small peasants, only benefiting the already well-off. Especially in the 
1960s and 1970s, such claims about increased social stratification as a consequence of 
the Green Revolution were common (see e.g. Frankel 1971; Griffin 1974; Feder 1983). 
But this was before the effects of the Green Revolution could be more thoroughly 
documented and, as it appears, much of these claims were based on assumptions. They 
were aired too early and in many cases they seem to have been founded on a general 
hostility towards ‘modernisation’. After all, these were the heydays of the ‘dependence 
school’ and the ‘package’ was opposed inter alia because it was believed to represent a 
“counter revolution” aimed at preventing the real, ‘red’ revolution which many at the 
time were anticipating (see e.g. Lappé & Collins 1973). In the words of Griffin 
(1993:144), it represented “an attempt to substitute technical change for institutional 
change”. Hence, it has been stated that the Green Revolution represents “no more than 
another deceptive strategy by the national and foreign bourgeoisie to suppress the 
peasantry and ensure [Africa’s] dependence for food” (Nzimoro 1985:xx). The same 
message is frequently aired today by a manifold of NGOs and ‘counter culture’ 
representatives attacking Green Revolution technologies because they are seen as part 
of a process of ‘globalisation’ that should be rejected. 
 
Later research has revealed that, by and large, the technology has been scale-neutral 
(Griffin 1993; Tripp 1997; Mosley 2002). Both directly and indirectly, also the small 
cultivators have, actually, in many places benefited from the new technology (Lipton &  
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Longhurst 1989; Hazell & Ramasamy 1991; Jirström 1996; Mosley 2001; Djurfeldt 
2001).
8 Consequently, the critique of the Green revolution has tended somewhat to shift 
focus. While the poor are still sometimes said not to have benefited (at all), it is also 
stated that “the incidence of poverty is particularly high among indigenous populations” 
(Madeley 2002:34), and that “eighteen of the 23 countries facing the most severe 
problems in feeding their people are African” (ibid, p33f). But African countries and 
indigenous peoples are those that, so far, have been the least affected by the Green 
Revolution. This can, therefore, not be an argument for it’s rejection. On the contrary, it 
indicates that this is exactly where it may be needed.  
 
Moreover, when poor people in areas where the Green Revolution has occurred have 
not benefited, this is often because of unequal access to credit, extension services, input 
supply and marketing of output reflect an already existing, stratified social order 
(Griffin 1993).
9 But these circumstances – while definitely belonging to the broader 
conceptualisation of the ‘package’ initially offered – are not part of the technology per 
se. Instead, they illustrate that at least some of the problems attributed to the Green 
Revolution should not be sought in its technology proper, but rather in how it has been 
introduced and supported (or not). 
 
What all this amounts to, is (at this stage) a two-fold lesson. First, that whereas the 
Green Revolu-tion is not a genuine redistributive strategy of development, “the two 
have a number of features in common” (Griffin 1993:160) and it can, in fact, represent a 
pro-poor policy instrument (Mosley (2002). The second lesson is that we should be 
careful to avoid regarding the Green Revolution as a static phenomenon and/or merely 
as the introduction (imposition) of an unchangeable, once-and-for-all ready-made 
                                                 
8 An interesting observation of the different sources of critique of the Green Revolution is provided by 
Freebairn (1995) who conducted a study of more than 300 reports about the effects of the Green 
Revolution published between 1970 and 1989. Freebairn found that authors from Western developed 
countries, those employing an essay approach and those looking at multi-country regions — i.e. outsiders 
with a generalizing, sometimes sweeping, and far-away perspective — tended to report increased income 
inequalities. On the other hand, authors of an Asian origin, using the case-study method — i.e. those 
basing their statements on close contact and first-hand knowledge — tended not to associate the new 
technology with increased income inequalities. 
9 In many places, these circumstances have been dramatically accentuated during the last two decades’ 
externally imposed Structural Adjustment Programs. Prices on inputs (seed, fertilizer) and interest rates 
on credit have increased exorbitantly and prevent smallholders from using a technology they often say 
that they want. However, it would be pre-mature to assign the problems of unequal accessibility of either 
Green Revolution technology proper or credit singularly to market mechanisms and contemporary policy-
shifts. Friis-Hansen (1994:3), reporting from pre-reform Tanzania, says that “a politically well-connected 
village could receive more than it demanded [of hybrid maize seeds], while other villages received only a 
fragment of their requirement.”  
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technology package. Instead, I believe it is important to acknowledge its dynamic 
character. Also, the Green Revolution’s dynamism is not confined to the above 
mentioned evolutions. Recent advancements in agro-bio-technology and, especially, 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) not only show that the content of the Green 
Revolution changes and expands, it also opens up vast new avenues for research and 
implementation (more on this issue below). 
 
 
Claims About Environmental Unsustainability 
This, however, is not to say that all is well. Especially the environmental effects of the 
Green Revolution are often seen as being harmful or even disastrous (Djurfeldt 2002). It 
is widely claimed that “Green Revolution-style farming is not ecologically sustainable” 
(Rosset et al 2000:4; see also Madeley 2002). A frequently lamented loss of bio-
diversity together with a prevalence of so-called ‘second-generation problems’, caused 
by “excessive use of modern inputs such as chemical ferti-lizers and agro-chemicals” 
(Babu 2000) are now presented as proof that ‘another development’ is more appropriate 
– also in agriculture. This critique can be divided into two categories, one claiming that 
the Green Revolution no longer revolutionizes agriculture, and the other arguing that it 
has back-fired.  
 
Losing Momentum? 
As for the first claim, it has frequently been observed that, after some decades of 
successful yield-increases, cereal yields seem to have levelled off in the major 
producing regions and reached what are commonly called ‘yield-plateaus’ (Jirström 
1996; Pingali & Hossain 1997) or even that they have begun declining (Rosset et al 
2000). Usually, such stagnation is said to be the result of declining soil-fertility and/or 
pest infestations caused by growing pest immunity to pesticides (Khor 2001). This may 
well be the case – at least in some places. However, critics sometimes seem to jump on 
this conclusion a little too hastily. After all, it would be astonishing indeed if yield-
plateaus were not reached at some stage. Here, it is interesting to note that many of 
those who take the existence of ceilings or yield plateaus as proof that the Green 
Revolution is ‘unsuccessful’ other-wise tend to condemn the thought of ‘eternal growth’ 
as unrealistic. Apart from such considerations, non-ecological factors may explain at 
least part of this levelling-off tendency. Yield plateaus also emerge because many years  
 
9
of falling world-market prices on rice and wheat reduce the incentives for peasants and 
governments alike to invest, and also because “demand from those who can pay has 
largely been met. Efforts to increase productivity tend to create an excess of supply 
which is beyond the market’s capacity to absorb” (Gerremo 1998; see also FAO 2002). 
Hence, for many who have already adopted Green Revolution technologies, it would 
not make much sense to opt for more, at least not for the time being. But that does not 
prove that it would be impossible.  
 
Moreover, increased pest problems are not necessarily – and, particularly, not uniquely 
– caused by growing sensitivity to pest infestations. As shown by Jirström (1996) in his 
study of the Green Revolution in Malaysia, higher agricultural productivity and 
increased wealth is accompanied by diversified labour-markets and higher costs for 
labour. Manual weeding gradually becomes too costly and peasants substitute 
technology (mechanisation, chemicals) for labour. Similarly, in Egypt, when labour-
costs increase and child-labour becomes less available, manual picking of cotton bull-
worm is replaced by chemical pest-control because it is cheaper (Holmén 1991). The 
reported pest-problems in Green Revolution areas (allegedly the singular cause for 
yield-plateaus) seem, at least partially, to be caused by higher costs (= greater problems) 
for pest-control – not, necessarily, by increased vulnerability to pests. It would, of 
course, be possible to maintain manual pest-control in those above referred settings – 
but only as long as labour has a very low price, i.e. on the conditions that people stay 
poor and that rural areas are not affected by development. 
 
Nature’s Revenge? 
The second type of ecologically based critique centres around deteriorating soil, water 
and plant qualities. This may be a much more serious threat to future food production 
than (substantially raised) plateaus. Uninterrupted land-utilization demands large 
supplies of nutrients but prolonged supply of chemical fertilizer is held to exhaust the 
soil’s natural nutrients and, hence, land becomes degraded and petro-dependent (Rosset 
et al 2000). It can be argued that, in Africa, these are lesser problems than elsewhere. 
Ten years ago, the average fertilizer consumption (NPK) per hectare of cropland  in 
Africa was about 20 kg, against 300 kg in China and about 100 kg in the developed 
countries and “in African smallholder staple food crops, applications of less than 5 
kg/ha [were] common” (FAO 1996:15). Most likely, smallholder application of  
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purchased fertilizer has declined rather than increased since then. Hence, there seems to 
be ample room for (increased) application of mineral fertilizers in Africa before 
ecologically hazardous levels are reached. In any case, there is “no escape from some 
simple facts of severe phosphate deficiencies in many African soils and the need to 
ameliorate highly acid soils in Africa … to obtain significant yield increases” (ibid). 
 
Irrigation in hot climates has been found to lead to problems of water-logging and/or 
salinisation in some cases. To restore the natural fertility of such land is both time-
consuming and expensive (and therefore, perhaps, less likely to happen). Irrigated 
Green Revolution agriculture has often implied mono-cropping
10, which is held to be 
particularly disastrous (see Madeley 2002). Mono-cropping increases the crop’s 
vulnerability to attacks from insect pests and therefore demands the use of pesticides.
11 
Pesticides, like fertilizer, tend to leak and turn up where they are not supposed to be 
found, polluting insect predators as well as groundwater, rivers and lakes. This, 
generally, is a bigger problem in temperate climates than in the tropics where 
evaporation is higher. In the latter, salinisation and mineralisation of the soil are often 
bigger or, at least, additional problems. How-ever, as indicated above, these risks are 
likely to be smaller in Africa than in, for example, Asia or the USA.  
 
But, since pests have a tendency to become immune to pesticides, chemical ‘solutions’ 
will not eliminate the problem but merely be a temporary solution at best. Mono-
cropping, moreover, has been seen as particularly disastrous because modern, 
‘scientific’ agriculture tends to become increasingly dependent on a narrow genetic base 
of high-yielding varieties (Asiema 1994; Madeley 2002). Ironically, while the scientific 
modernization of agriculture aimed not only at boosting harvests but also at stabilizing 
                                                 
10 The term ’mono-cropping’ is mostly used to designate large-scale production units where only one or a 
few crops are grown, such as the big farms in the US corn- or wheat-belts, flood-plains in India or China, 
or the vast, terraced land-scapes of rice production in Indonesia or the Philippines. On this scale, mono-
cropping can indeed be hazardous and tends to become increasingly pesticide-dependent. However, the 
concept ‘mono-cropping’ is also sometimes used to characterize individual fields — which need not be 
large at all — planted with a singular crop. This is then seen as equally hazardous and the ‘only’ remedy 
is mixed farming also at this micro-level scale (see e.g. Madeley 2002). 
11 It appears that the critique of mono-cropping often tends to be exaggerated and somewhat misdirected. 
The problem with mono-culture is not so much that ‘entire’ fields are planted with a singular crop, but the 
tendency to grow the same crop, notably rice, all-year round when possible. This (and the large-scale 
mono-cropping mentioned above) provides a large and extended breeding-period for pests. But this type 
of mono-cropping is not as common as the critics would have it. The Chinese, for example, have since a 
long time abandoned the idea of mono-culture and, e.g. in the Red River delta in Vietnam, peasants rotate 
two rice harvests with one vegetable crop, which gives a welcome break and reduces the risk of pest-
infestations. The method is also called ‘break-crop’-practice (Jirström, personal communication).  
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yields and eliminating hazards, because of this narrowness, the vulnerability of farming 
systems is seen to increase as modernisation proceeds. Such worries should not be 
ignored. 
 
However, it has been questioned whether Green Revolution technologies actually do 
lead to loss of bio-diversity (see e.g. FAO 1996). Moreover, there is another side to this 
environmental aspect (and here I would like to quote Norman Borlaug – the ‘father of 
the Green Revolution’ – extensively). In order to feed a growing (and more prosperous) 
world population, by the year 2050 the world must produce nearly three times as much 
food as today. This necessary increase in food production has to come “from the 
farmland we are already using, in order to save the planet’s wild-lands.” Countering the 
environmentalist critique of the Green Revolution, he says that “[t]he high yields of the 
Green Revolution … had a dramatic conservation effect: saving millions of acres of 
wild-lands all over the Third World from being cleared for more low-yield crops” 
(Borlaugh 2002). Thus, “if Asia’s average cereal yields of 1961 (930 kg/hectare) would 
have been maintained, the world would have needed nearly an additional 600 million 
hectares of the same quality to realize the total harvest of 1997” (Borlaugh 2000). Also, 
he says, there is no scientific evidence that modern foods should be less healthy than 
yesterday’s and he further questions the critics’ claim that the Green Revolution is 
risking the world’s bio-diversity. “Some of the nay-sayers … apparently think that it’s 
more important to save man-made biodiversity, such as antique farmers’ varieties, than 
to save the rich web of unique species characteristic of a wild forest.” The sad truth is, 
he says, that “low-yielding farming is only sustainable for people with high death rates” 
(Borlaugh 2002). I believe we should take such points ad notam. 
Moreover, to a considerable extent, the above mentioned problems are not ‘obvious’ or 
unavoidable effects of the Green Revolution technology. There is a widespread reaction 
among environmentalist critics of the Green Revolution leading to calls for total 
abandonment of the technology. But while there, no doubt, are reasons for concern, I do 
not think there is ground for panic. Rather, the above mentioned adversities should 
perhaps best be seen as ‘teething-problems’ which are likely to disappear as technology 
– and its users – mature. In many cases they are the consequences of faulty 
implementation: irrigation without (proper) drainage, inefficient or insufficient 
extension services, untimely fertilization or fertilization in improper dosage, faulty  
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application of pesticides, etc.. Better preparation and improved handling of the 
technology could reduce, if not eliminate, the adversaries mentioned. 
  
 Nevertheless, warnings about modern farming’s negative environmental effects often 
need to be taken seriously. It will often be wise to apply some kind of precautionary 
principle. But this is not to say that the Green Revolution technologies should be 
squarely rejected. Precaution need not be translated into prohibition. As will be argued 
below, it may well be the case that many solutions to the perceived problems are to be 
found within the modern paradigm itself. As with so many other debated questions, one-
sided positioning and stubborn either-or declarations are likely to miss the key issues. 
Moreover, we often know too little about these issues, their extent and possible severity. 
Many warnings about ecological disaster have been found to be exaggerated and/or 
based on misin-terpretations (Helldén 1991; Leach & Mearns 1996), on methodological 
errors (Lomborg 1998) and even on deliberate disinformation (ibid.). 
 
 
Time for a Second Green Revolution? 
The issue of the Green Revolution remains highly controversial. Contemporary 
standpoints go in various directions. The debate is complicated, not only by the 
technicalities involved and a common lack of reliable data, but also by the emotions it 
arouses. It seems fair to say that, in part at least, this is a symbolic debate permeated by 
aspirations or anxieties about development that go far beyond the realm of agriculture. 
This is reflected in the vocabulary used, which tends to be permeated by “political 
purposes that ignore the complexities and subtleties of agricultural change” (Tripp 
1997:24). Despite the heterogeneity of debaters involved, the contenders in this 
controversy are commonly grouped (indeed, are often grouping themselves) into two 
opposing ‘camps’ – for or against the Green Revolution. Although not entirely 
satisfactory, for reasons of expedience, I will follow this established pattern. 
 
A Continued Green Revolution but of a Different Kind 
As mentioned, it is widely believed that the Green Revolution has reached its limits – at 
least in those areas where it has so far been implemented. If it were to be extended to 
other, i.e. dryer, areas, it would need to be of a different kind – emphasizing other crops, 
short maturation, drought tolerance, etc. (Harsch 2001; World Bank 1997; ICRISAT  
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2001). Unlike the ‘traditional’ Green Revolution, which (with some exaggeration) was 
‘made for’ the well-endowed, populous and easily farmed flood-plains and therefore 
could be introduced on a larger scale, a modified Green Revolution will need to be 
small-scale and able to adapt to a variety of agro-ecological environ-ments. Improved 
watershed management technologies, rainwater harvesting, conservation tillage and 
integrated (non-toxic) pest management technology are all part of this modified 
package. As shown above, this reorientation has already begun. In order to further adapt 
the Green Revolution to the world’s dry-lands, more research will be needed and this 
will be a costly business (I’ll return to this topic below).  
 
It can be argued that the ‘traditional’ Green Revolution to a large extent meant an 
adaptation of the environment to the crop – enhanced water supply (or control), 
elimination (albeit perhaps only temporarily) of pests, enrichment of soil nutrients 
through fertilizer application. This ambition to modify nature for human purpose is 
often seen as a negative characteristic of modern agriculture. Since all agriculture 
implies the manipulation of nature and since all fields are to some extent artifi-cial eco-
systems, I find this critique somewhat unfair. Also in an environment-friendly, ‘doubly-
green’ revolution, it will still be necessary to manipulate nature. Nevertheless, in its 
modified variety the Green Revolution, to a large extent, is rather a question of 
“adapting the crops to their environments” (ICRISAT 2001). This accentuates the 
heated issue of genetically modified crops and animal breeds.  
 
Through manipulation of crop-genes, proponents stress that many adversities of the 
older Green Revolution – as well as the vulnerabilities of many ‘traditional’ farming 
technologies – can be avoided. Prakash (2000), thus, finds that genetic engineering is 
“clearly the most revolutionary tool to impact agricultural research since the discovery 
of genetics by Mendel”. By use of biotechnology, “crop damage can be minimized 
through disease- and pest-resistant varieties while reducing the use of chemicals” (ibid). 
Gordon Conway, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, believes that biotechnology 
is the “key to easing hunger” (Harris 2001). Using biotechnology and genetic 
engineering, crops can be made nitrogen-fixating, thus reducing the need for chemical 
fertilizers. This could dramatically improve the poor peasant’s access to high-yielding 
varieties which s/he today often cannot afford to grow. More crops can be made high-
yielding at the same time as a variety of crops can be made pest-resistant, nutrient- and  
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vitamin-rich, more suitable for storage, etc. Crops can be designed to suit different 
niches in a variegated agro-ecological environ-ment and at the same time reduce 
transport and storage costs as the use of agri-chemicals is reduced. This would finally 
make it possible to bring the Green Revolution to Africa’s many poor, remote and less 
accessible areas. The GMO-technology, due not only to its high yield-potential but also 
because of its potential to stabilize harvests, can further save marginal lands from being 
farmed and, hence, reduce the risk of erosion and soil degradation.
12 But GMO-
technology also frightens many people. 
 
A Different Kind of Agriculture 
Contenders today argue that this above sketched approach is unacceptable. Instead, it is 
deemed essential to reject and de-mask the “Green Revolution myth” (Rosset et al 
2000). The above refer-red concerns about productivity plateaus and negative 
environmental impact are prominent argu-ments in this ‘camp’. Moreover, it is asserted 
that a narrow focus on production increasing techno-logies “cannot alleviate hunger”, 
because it does not address root-causes of skewed wealth distribu-tion and lack of food-
entitlement. Instead, it is argued, a different – re-distributive and pro-poor – economic 
system is required. This, it is argued, will also promote an alternative kind of agriculture 
– small-scale and self-reliant, environment-friendly but highly productive and, hence, 
both socially and ecologically sustainable (ibid). This, apparently, is a widely embraced 
‘strategy’, said to be particularly suitable for Africa.  
 
Thus, for poor countries, the Green Revolution is seen to represent an inappropriate 
high-input/high-output technology aimed primarily at increasing profit for multinational 
biotech-giants. This so called first agricultural paradigm, “seeks to control nature in 
order to provide crops and animals with optimal growth conditions, at the same time as 
crops and animals are adapted so that they can utilise the improved environment” (Friis-
Hansen 2000:6). The proposed alternative, the second agricultural paradigm instead 
takes as its starting-point “local environmental constraints and seeks possibilities to 
increase productivity by improving local peasants’ existing farming systems without 
necessarily increasing their use of external inputs” (ibid). In this ‘camp’, it is 
                                                 
12 Biotechnology applied to non-food crops can have the same effect. India, being the world’s third 
largest producer of cotton, has a productivity per acre about half or a third of its major competitors. The 
country’s recent acceptance of genetically modified, insect-pest resistant, BT-cotton is expected not only 
to allow it to dramatically reduce the use of pesticides, at the same time it can also save large amounts of 
land for other uses (or for no use at all).  
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emphasized that technologies should be developed in the environment where they are 
meant to be implemented. By learning from the local peasants, by using various 
participatory methods, by using traditional farming techniques like agro-forestry, inter-
cropping, water harvesting, nitrogen fixating plants and biological pest control, etc. it is 
believed that low-external-input agriculture (LEIA) can be “highly productive” 
(Madeley 2002; see also Alders et al 1993).  
 
This is more than likely and I am convinced that there are important lessons to be 
learned ‘from below’ – but if they really are that good, why then, so often, do traditional 
farming systems not produce enough food for those who manage them? Especially in 
regions where harvests fluctuate due to climatic instability and erratic rainfall – such as 
sub-Saharan Africa – it is questionable whether high productivity levels can be 
sustained over extended periods using LEIA. History, after all, seems to tell a different 
story. Moreover, it will be hard to convince me that extreme LEIA (so called 
‘permaculture’, using no external inputs at all, not even credit) will increase output by 
300 to 400 per cent (Madeley 2002:43f). And even if an example of this can be 
presented, will it be replicable? 
 
Vandana Shiva (quoted in ibid. p27) even maintains that the productivity of traditional 
low-input agriculture can be “hundreds of times higher” than that of modern high-input 
agriculture. We need to ask ourselves whether the poor people on earth are really helped 
by such promises that alchemy is possible. Being a lay-man in natural science, I’m 
inclined to believe that low-input/high-output would be against the laws of nature 
except, perhaps, for very brief periods of time. The frequent reports about soil-mining 
that presently flood scientific journals indicate that I might be right in my assumption. 
To further support this stand-point, a recently released major study of organic farming 
found that while such agriculture does “leave the soil healthier”, it can (under ideal 
conditions) be “nearly as productive as regular farms for some crops” (Science Now 
2002; emphasis added). The question therefore remains whether low-input agriculture 
can also be able to sustainably feed a world population of  eight or ten billion people? 






The Heated GMO-Debate 
There is, however, in relation to this problematic, a matter over which we indeed need 
to be worried. That is the question of ownership of food-technologies. A great deal of 
anger and many calls for rejecting ‘modern’ agriculture in general, and genetically 
modified varieties in particular, are due to the fact that genetic codes are being patented 
by large, western, trans-national corpora-tions over which people have no (democratic) 
control. As the argument goes, these giant companies not only make agriculture 
dependent on their patented seeds and (appropriately designed) fertilizers and pesticides 
– their thus created monopolies do not cater for the farmer in the first place but tend to 
siphon-off any surpluses earned from agriculture. And this is only the beginning.  
 
Due to WTO agreements on Intellectual Property Rights, it is now possible to patent 
any genetic code – and hence appropriate the ‘ownership’ of crops that peasants have 
grown for generations (for example, the recent American efforts to ‘acquire’ the 
ownership of traditional Indian Basmati rice). Bio-piracy and advanced laboratory 
research may eventually, if these economic giants have it their way, force every farmer 
and every small peasant on earth to pay royalties for planting seeds. And, as on-going 
court-trials in the US show, these corporations even try to make farmers pay who never 
planted the seeds! Even in the case where ‘normal’ plants were pollinated from 
genetically modified plants on someone-else’s neighbouring fields, the corporation still 
claims its ‘right’ to royalties. This is really fantastic! If anyone has the right to 
compensation, it ought to be the innocent farmer who had his fields involuntarily 
polluted by unwanted substances from outside.  
 
For such reasons, massive counter-attacks have been launched during later years. Much 
of this opposition is aired on behalf of people in poor countries. Poor people not only 
have weak bargain-ing power, but “[p]aradoxically, the poorest people in the world live 
in the world’s biodiversity hot spots” (Limson 2002). These areas are potential sources 
for profitable gene-exploitation both for improved food-crops and for new medical 
discoveries. Africa in particular “stands to lose huge benefits from its biodiversity for 
lack of legal protection against bio-piracy” (ibid). But not only bio-piracy is a cause of 
contemporary worries. So-called “terminator”-genes lead to seed-sterility and, if 
distributed, will force peasants to buy fresh seeds every season instead of saving from  
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his or her own harvest.
13 If the biotech multinationals get away with it, they will soon 
control the whole global food-chain (PAN 2002; Carroll 2002). And this is a serious 
problem indeed. It should be addressed by intellectual property rights-reform and on 
this issue I agree with the critics of TNCs, western governments and the WTO. But it is 
not a good reason to reject bio-technology as such. 
 
Neither is the frequently encountered claim that genetically engineered pest-resistance is 
incapable of offering permanent solutions. Critics argue that, for example, the BT-
cotton (containing a gene, transferred from a bacteria, that makes the plant toxic to 
insects) has proved to be less of a success than claimed and that this and similar 
innovations will become useless because pests will develop resistance to the toxin (see 
Mason 2002). But ‘useless’ is a too strong word. It is misleading to dismiss 
technologies on the grounds that they do not offer instant and/or permanent solutions. 
They may offer fairly durable solutions and/or solutions to some problems, though. In a 
constantly evolv-ing system, that is as much as we can hope for. Also, implicit in the 
above critique (and sometimes explicit, see e.g. Giampietro 2002) is the idea that only 
one or a few pest-resistant varieties would be enough. It is, however, unrealistic to 
expect one GMO-solution to offer effective protection against all possible pests. And it 
is rather unfair to criticise GMOs on the grounds that they do not offer full-coverage 
solutions. Bio-technology is still in its infancy and in time it is likely to offer a bundle 
of (partial) pest-resistant alternatives. This requires prolonged and, most likely, 
enhanced investments in bio-technology research. The problem is not that this kind of 
research is a dead-end, but rather that future agriculture is likely to become more costly 
than we have been accustomed to. 
 
 
To Have or Have Not 
Critics of the Green Revolution generally and of biotechnology in particular tend to 
overlook not only that all agricultural systems are artificial eco-systems, but also that 
genetic manipulation is as old as plant-breeding itself. True, science has now reached a 
stage where it is possible to transfer a genetic code from one species to another, say, 
                                                 
13 Due to heavy criticism from NGOs, development-aid organizations and LDC-governments, Monsanto 
— a leading biotech company with patent-applications for terminator technology in more than 70 
countries (Madeley 2002) — last year “pledged to drop plans to market terminator seeds” (Harris 2001). 




from a fish to a plant or from a bacteria to a cow, and that is a qualitative difference 
from previous practices. In a sense, mankind has now (not some hundred years ago) 
acquired the tools to create not only friendly varieties but also Frankenstein’s monster. 
Whether we shall allow ourselves to tamper with the ‘basic elements of life’ is an 
ethical and philosophical dilemma which, perhaps, has not been sufficiently penetrated. 
However, as long as there is no general ban on genetic research and engineering – and I 
very much doubt that there will ever be one – we have to put this kind of knowledge to 
its best possible use.  
 
Many people are worried today, because biotechnology takes us (i.e. you and me, 
among others, and we weren’t even asked) into the unknown and this is perceived as a 
risky endeavour. However, “[t]he simple fact that there is ‘hazard’ associated with 
large-scale adoption of GMOs in agriculture does not imply per se that research and 
experimentation in this field should be stopped altogether. Current demographic trends 
clearly show that we are facing a serious hazard (social, economic, ecological) related to 
future food production, [but] … such a hazard applies to all forms of agricultural 
development also when excluding GMOs” (Giampietro 2002:469). It needs also to be 
remembered that, whereas traditional techniques for improved plant and animal 
breeding were uncontrolled and rather haphazardous, modern technologies and their 
products are rigorously monitored in ways that were never before possible. If only for 
this reason, the risk of creating ‘frankenfoods’ may be reduced with the new 
technology, rather than enhanced. 
 
The way I see it, both ‘traditional’ Green Revolution technologies – now that they are 
no longer confined to a few crops in a few favoured areas – and the new ‘Gene 
Revolution’ technologies have a great potential to improve food availability for a 
growing world population. They may be particularly suitable for alleviating hunger 
problems in dry-lands such as Africa which, as the saying goes, have so far largely been 
by-passed by agricultural technology advancements. 
 
Biotechnology may – finally – allow us to design crops suitable for variegated and less 
extensive agro-ecological environments. It can reduce the need for chemical fertilizer 
and it may eventually eliminate the need for pesticides. In short, it has enormous 
potentials. Today, however, biotechno-logies are misused and misdirected. Terminator  
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technology is only one aspect of this problem. Another is ‘traitor-technology’, i.e. seeds 
“designed to grow … only in conjunction with [specific] external chemical inputs” 
(Glover 2002:6; see also Mongelard & Warnock 2002). It is, for example possible to 
design plants that are toxic to insects and therefore do not need the application of 
pesticides. More such research is obviously needed. Instead, the biotech giants make 
other priorities. Monsanto, for example, has “inserted a gene into wheat that allows it to 
withstand the company’s Roundup herbicide, which now kills everything growing in its 
path” (Fallding 2002). Under the prevailing economic logic, it is no doubt ‘sound’ 
policy for the agro-chemical corpo-rations to prioritise pesticide-tolerance over pest-
resistance, at least in the short run. However, this is a perverted logic. In fact, it is as if 
Thomas Alva Edison in the 19
th century, instead of inventing the electric light, would 
have said to himself: ‘Electricity is a marvellous thing, it must have an infinite number 
of possible uses – I think I’ll invent the electric chair’. This is reason enough to deny the 
biotech-industry their much desired right of gene-ownership.  
 
The ‘market’, in many situations, is an effective and preferable allocator of rights, 
resources and entitlements. But there are differences between ‘commodities’ and 
commodities, and the ‘basic elements of life’ should not be treated as any ‘tradable’. 
Hence, private interests should be denied patents on and ‘ownership’ of genetic codes. 
Instead, these (ought to) belong to all mankind and must be recognised as common 
property. Biotechnology research is costly and if the findings cannot be patented, no 
private corporations will engage in it. But we still need biotechnology. The problem is 
that governments have left this fundamental field to the whims of the ‘market’. But the 
market operates for those who have an ‘effective demand’ and has hitherto been content 
with investing in the major crops for large-scale producers and/or a multitude of 
customers in populous, well-endowed and easily accessible areas. Not much market-
based research has been directed towards the needs of small peasants (Spillane & Thro 
2000) and the market, generally, has not deemed it worth-while to invest in less 
profitable research on odd crops or small agro-ecological niches. Hence, this appears to 
be the domain of the public and non-profit sectors.  
 
However, here a major – and disturbing – change has taken place during the life-time of 
the Green Revolution. Whereas the research leading to the ‘original’ Green Revolution 
was “for the most part publicly funded, with international agricultural research centres  
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(IARCs) and national agricultural research institutes (NARs) playing an important role” 
(Mongelard & Warnock 2002:4; see also Djurfeldt & Jirström 2002), governments 
today have to a large extent given up on such ambitions. Not only have many 
governments been ‘rolled back’ in poor countries – especially in Africa – during the last 
two decades of ‘structural adjustment’, also in rich countries – which could afford 
spending on basic agricultural research – public funding for agricultural research, 
including bio-technology, has declined over a number of years (Asiema 1994; Hassan & 
Karanja 1997; Harsch 2001; Eicher 2001; World Food Price Foundation 2002; 
Greenpeace 2002).  
 
At the same time, it is reported that this financial squeezing of governments poses a 
threat to bio-diversity that, perhaps, is greater than the frequently mentioned narrowing 
down of the (com-mercially utilised) genetic base of modern crop varieties. Due to 
declining financial resources, many of the world’s publicly owned seed-banks 
(especially in the Third World) are on the verge of collapse. Some, like that in Uganda, 
have already collapsed. Gene- or seed-banks are “the treasure troves of mankind’s 
agricultural heritage” and their collections represent a significant share of the world’s 
crop diversity (Bowers 2002). “Most of the banks consist of rows of fridges in which 
rare seeds and germ-plasm is stored. But in many countries there is not enough money 
to keep the power running, let alone periodically grow and regenerate the stock. ... 
[Hence, before long] communities around the world may find their genebanks have 
simply turned to compost heaps” (ibid). 
 
It is thus essential that governments in poor countries as well as in rich engage more in 
agricultural research and gene-technology and that more, not less, public money is again 
allocated to the preservation of gene-banks – for the common good. Since no national 
agricultural research institute can cover all relevant fields and no national seed-bank can 
preserve all species, international cooperation, division of labour and networking will be 
required. Hence, not only national institutes but, foremost, international institutions 
such as the FAO and the CGIARs, should be strengthened as they uphold the “principle 
of keeping as much research as possible within the public domain, where it can be made 




Accordingly, it is not very fruitful to condemn technologies or, for that matter, for 
critics of scientific agriculture and/or the contemporary global (dis)order to ‘reclaim the 
streets’. It rather seems more important to reclaim knowledge – particularly the public 
ownership of gene-technology and basic food-knowledge. When that is done, green and 
gene technologies can be put to humanly as well as ecologically sound use. To be sure, 
the new technologies allow GMOs to be tailored for odd crops and small ecosystems to 
a much greater extent than was possible with the ‘old’ Green Revolution package. 
Similarly, much more than previously, GMOs can be combined with – and improve – 
organic and ‘biological’ techniques for environment-friendly pest-control as well as 
enhanced fertilizer-use efficiency and/or biological nitrogen fixation, among other 
things (see e.g. Fixen & West 2002; Roy et al 2002). Even if today’s technology is 
promising, it will not be automatically appropriate by itself. There is a need for engaged 
social scientists (and others) to influence the scope and direction of genetic and other 
agricultural research in order to safeguard its pro-poor potentials (see e.g. Lipton (1999) 
on this issue). This will require more cooperation be-tween scientists, peasants and local 
organisations and, especially, it will require more participatory and learning approaches. 
But this, I believe, is already in the pipe-line.  
 
And it can be done – if opponents were more precise in their target selection. Madeley 
(2002) equalises Green Revolution technology with ‘terminator technology’ and, 
apparently, many agitated NGOs and environmentalists do the same. But this is a 
mistake. The question is not whether green or gene technologies are good or bad. 
Technologies are seldom good or bad in themselves and, as argued above, they can be 
used in various ways – for good or for not so good purposes. Hence, the question has to 
be reformulated into ‘who owns the technology?’ and ‘who determines its use?’. Failing 
to do this – when, in only a few decades time, the world population is expected to reach 
ten billion people – many contemporary critics of the Green Revolution may regret 
finding themselves having thrown the baby out with the bath-water. 
 
 
A Green Revolution – African Style 
After fifty years of development promotion and despite the use of many different 
strategies of development, Africa remains poor and agriculture “has proven to be the 
Achilles heel of virtually every strategy for development [applied on the continent]”  
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(Mkandawire & Soludo 1999:112). Hence, as this paper has consistently argued, 
“Africa has yet to have its Green Revolution” (ibid. p54). Now the time for that might 
have come. Despite common simplifications and a widespread static view of the Green 
Revolution, it is not a static ‘thing’ and should preferably be seen as an adaptable and 
dynamic process. Its technological developments today offer a range of new 
possibilities which until recently were not available. Crop research has presented 
breakthroughs on some crops that are of major importance in Africa. These new 
varieties need less irrigation and they not only yield more, they are also often richer in 
nutrients, drought-tolerant, early maturing and pest-resistant. Hence, the new 
technology has the potential both to increase and stabilise yields, especially in areas 
where rainfall is erratic and unreliable. Finally, from the technological point of view, the 
Green Revolution has become Africa-friendly. 
 
A Green Revolution in Africa has to take its departure in a smallholder setting. 
Moreover, the smallholders are dispersed over an agro-ecological landscape that is 
much more heterogeneous than were those areas where the original Green Revolution 
had its strongest impact, for example, in Asia’s river-plains. But the new technology 
allows adaptation to such variegated natural precondi-tions to a much higher degree 
than what was previously possible. Linked to that, an African Green Revolution has the 
potential to be much more pro-poor than critics usually want to admit – provided, of 
course, that it’s availability to smallholders with limited financial means is not restricted 
by artificial ‘ownership’ regulations. Ensuring the African smallholders better access to 
new technology is a pro-poor measure in it self. This potential is enhanced partly 
because of the technology’s adaptability but also because of its scale-neutrality and its 
tendency to reduce risks for small cultivators (Tripp 1997; Mosley 2001, 2002). 
 
This, however, is not to say that I expect, or even propagate, an immediate and large-
scale flooding of Africa with hybrids and/or GMO-seeds. That is rather unlikely and, in 
any case, African agricul-ture does not only need the latest scientific innovations. 
Traditional and modern technologies are preferably to be seen as complementary, rather 
than as mutually exclusive. Much can be accom-plished by a combination of improved 
traditional techniques and selective introduction of modern seeds and practices, viz. 
there should be room for a parallel utilisation of improved traditional varieties and 
composite as well as hybrid and GMO-crops. Similarly, white (chemical) fertiliser does  
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not need to replace, but can coexist with brown (manure) and green (compost) 
fertilisers.  
 
Moreover, Africa is too vast, many of its cultivators are too dispersed and there is, in 
many regions, a serious lack of infrastructure (roads, storage facilities, irrigation, 
markets and credit systems). This makes a rapid spreads of innovations less likely and 
an African Green Revolution will necessarily be a gradual, rather than an immediate 
change. At Africa’s present level of development, “[s]upply-ing a wider range of 
varieties, including hybrids, [GMOs], improved open-pollinated varieties and landraces, 
could enable especially poor farmers to shift their little resources around according to 
changing circumstances” (Friis-Hansen 1994:12). 
 
From a technological point of view, therefore, a Green Revolution in Africa is not only 
possible and necessary, it is also likely to have its own distinct ‘style’, distinguishing it 
from how agriculture developed in other parts of the world. The problems connected 
with an African Green Revolution are, thus, not so much to be looked for in the 
technology per se but rather (as initially mentioned) in State capacity and in the broader 
‘package’ that either facilitates or mitigates the spread of agricultural innovations. 
Particularly worrisome in this relation are the effects of certain structural adjustment 
policies leading to “the suppression of rural credit schemes that offered credit at 
subsidized rates. … This effectively denies African agriculture a major instrument of 
agrarian trans-formation that others have used with success elsewhere” (Mkandawire & 
Soludo 1999:113). 
 
Who’s Voice Counts? 
A multitude of lobby-groups, NGOs, political academics and various ‘alternative’ 
activists are now confronting (as they tend to perceive it) the ‘unholy alliance of global 
biotech corporations, western governments and aid agencies’ for trying to force GMOs 
upon poor and defenceless countries and populations assumed not to want these 
novelties. I believe this is largely a misdirected effort and, most likely, there is no 
conspiracy. Over the years, the Third World in general and Africa in particular, have 
been given a lot of bad advice. Recommendations to reject the Green Revolution is 
probably the worst of them all. While, no doubt, you may find people in poor countries 
who are worried about biotechnology, there are also many who regard it as a potential  
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solution to their problems. Hence, it has been stated – from the Third World, not (in this 
case) from the global agribusiness giants – that “application of biotechnology to 
agriculture is one of the most promising developments in modern science” (Babu 
2000:108; see also Prakash 2000) and many African scientists are convinced that Africa 
needs, for example, genetically modified crops to survive (Pearce 2000; Harsch 2001; 
Cherry 2002; Kirby 2002). But not only scientists and politicians believe so. Modern 
crop varieties, whether the products of biotechnology or conventional plant breeding, 
“are recognized by farmers as offering significant advantages in stabilizing their 
production” (Tripp 1997:24; see also Paarlberg 2001). Interviewing smallholders in 
Africa reveals that they want access to modern technology, were it only available in 
time and at a reasonable price (personal information). 
 
Hence, there is reason to be sceptical about whom the many (usually western) loud 
voices against the Green Revolution actually represent. Their claims of speaking on 
behalf of the people in poor countries are not always well-founded (Jordan & van Tuijl 
2000; Holmén 2002b) and, perhaps, this is particularly so in relation to environment and 
development (Cleary 1997; Tripp 2001). Hence, it has been pointed out that consumers 
in the rich countries, being well fed and comparatively rich – the ‘worried wealthy’ – 
can afford, if they wish, to take a sceptical view toward new technologies (Paarlberg 
2001). In contrast, those who live in countries where Green or Gene Revolutions have 
the potential of making a difference cannot. 
 
“If you live in Europe or the US, genetically modified food might sound like a 
luxury. But for people in poor countries, it’s the difference between a square meal 
and starvation” (Florence Wambugu, quoted in Pearce 2000:40). 
 
It appears that a lot of romanticism about ‘small is beautiful’ guides much anti-Green 
Revolution reasoning.
14 ‘Development’ has many definitions but if we can agree that 
one essential aspects is that the local becomes integrated into a larger and more complex 
whole, and that the parts of this whole tend to become increasingly differentiated and 
                                                 
14 A less romantic explanation could be that many NGOs pursuing anti-Green Revolution strategies do so 
because they lack financial resources and technical competence to engage in more demanding 
undertakings. They “face a challenge of making their efforts sustainable” and this, apparently, they can 
best do by safeguarding their market-niche and opt for “small seed production and distribution enterprises 




15 then part of this critique is actually anti-developmental. 
Hence, the frequent lamentations that commercialisation of agriculture will lead not 
only to its ‘industrialisation’ (Rosset et al 2000), but also to an unwanted kind of society 
(Shutt 2001). Apparently, many western agitators – nostalgic about a past which they 
never experienced – use the Green Revolution as a symbol, confusing technology with 
ownership and misuse with possible use. In the process, they tend to deny poor 
countries the development they desperately need. Similarly, some (urban) voices from 
the ‘South’, allegedly speaking on behalf of the African farmers, claim that by refusing 
to implement ‘modern techno-logies’, the latter aim to protect not only their food 
sovereignty but also to sustain “their livelihood systems” (Egzhiabher, 2002). In recent 
years, it has become fashionable to propagate ‘sustainable livelihood’. But, for 
development to occur, livelihood systems have to change. If that is where the shoe 
hurts, then this controversy is largely symbolic and poor rural inhabitants in the Third 
World would probably benefit more if concerns were more directly aired. 
 
 
                                                 
15 This applies to biology — from amoeba to wo/man, magnolia or eel — as well as to society: from small 
groups of hunters and gatherers, to increasingly larger and more complex socio-economic systems 
eventually ending(?) in some global entity. This analogy should not be stretched too far, however. When 
it comes to humans, the process is not only uni-directional. Whereas, for example, an eel or a magnolia 
will not be able to become part of some human group (people do have flower-pots and pets, but that is a 
different thing), larger human constructs — ethnic groups, states, cultures, economic systems — have the 
capacity to ‘absorb’ smaller entities (and to some extent transform them in the process). But that does not 
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